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Abstract 
One popular theory of moral responsibility locates responsible agency in 
exercises of control. These control-based theories often appeal to tracing to 
explain responsibility in cases where some agent is intuitively responsible 
for bringing about some outcome despite lacking direct control over that 
outcome’s obtaining. Some question whether control-based theories are 
committed to utilizing tracing to explain responsibility in certain cases. I 
argue that reflecting on certain kinds of negligence shows that tracing plays 
an ineliminable role in any adequate control-based theory of responsibility. 
 
0. Introduction 
Imagine that the lead news story describes a man who leads police on a high-speed chase 
down the highway while intoxicated. So intoxicated, in fact, that his BAC levels are three 
times the legal limit at the time of arrest. Before he is stopped, the man nearly runs over 
two pedestrians and rams several police cars. The story closes with the criminal charges: 
aggravated assault, DUI, fleeing the scene, all of which add up to the prospect of serious 
jail time. 
 The man’s behavior might provoke shock, though the criminal charges do not. 
Intoxicated drivers, particularly those that injure others or damage property, are often 
punished in one way or another. On reflection, this could seem odd. After all, the man (at 
the time of his driving) is not really aware of what he is doing and does not really possess 
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any self-control. So in virtue of what is this individual rightly blamed and accused? What 
accounts for the man’s responsibility for his actions?1 
 One intuitive line of thought is that the man is responsible for his behavior in 
virtue of being responsible for his earlier decision to drink to excess (cf. Vargas, 2005). 
Drinking heavily partially explains the subsequent drunk driving. Thus, insofar as the 
man possesses self-control and awareness at the time of beginning to drink heavily the 
man is responsible for any later harms or damages that he brings about in his 
incapacitated state. 
 This explanatory strategy is called tracing, and responsibility theorists have a long 
history of appealing to the concept of tracing to explain the responsibility of agents like 
drunk drivers.2 In general, theorists use tracing to explain why agents that lack control are 
still responsible for what they do by connecting (i.e., tracing) lack of control back to some 
earlier possession of control that explains the later lack of control.3 
 Tracing is central to many theories of responsibility, particularly those theories 
that locate responsible agency in the possession of control. Recently, however, critics of 
tracing have raised a challenge that calls into question whether tracing principles can do 
all the theoretical work assigned to them. For example, suppose that the captain of a ship 																																																								
1 My use of ‘responsibility’ refers to moral responsibility as opposed to causal, legal, or other forms of 
responsibility. The sense of moral responsibility at issue here is the accountability sense rather than the 
attributability and answerability senses of responsibility (cf. Shoemaker, 2015). A culpability-imputing form 
of blame, then, is central to the sense of moral responsibility discussed here. I focus on moral 
blameworthiness (as opposed to praiseworthiness or creditworthiness), where moral blameworthiness picks 
out a range of judgments and attitudes bound up in non-trivial ways to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of 
resentment, indignation, and guilt (Strawson, 1962). Lastly, I look only at retrospective moral responsibility, 
or responsibility for what one has done. 
2 Many theorists rely implicitly or explicitly on some notion of tracing: Vargas (2013); Smith (1983); 
Ekstrom (2000); van Inwagen (1989); Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 50); Dennett (1984: 13); Kane (1996: 39); 
Ginet (2000); Fischer and Tognazzini (2009); Timpe (2011); Audi (1991). Notable exceptions to this trend 
include Harry Frankfurt’s (1998) later work on responsibility, Mason (2015), Scanlon (1998, 2008), and 
Angela Smith (2005, 2008, 2015). This is only a sample of the relevant literature. 
3 The explanatory relation between some tracing anchor and the tracing terminus does not need to be 
causal.  
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is piloting her boat on a routine journey. Because the route is so familiar, she 
inadvertently slips into a daydream and, as a result of this, crashes into some submerged 
rocks.4 Here, the captain seems responsible for the crash despite the fact that she did not 
really possess control over the process that resulted in the crash (after all, it seems odd to 
say that the captain controls whether she slips into a daydream or not). There is no past 
moment at which she decides or intends or chooses or wills to either daydream or put 
herself in a position where she is likely to crash the boat.   
 In the abstract, the challenge stems from cases that describe some (relatively) non-
deliberative agent doing something for which she is responsible despite the fact that no 
earlier possession of control explains the subsequent non-deliberative state.5 We can see 
this in the example of the daydreaming captain. In these cases, there seems to be no 
suitable moment in the agent’s moral history that might anchor a trace and so no 
plausible explanation of responsibility in terms of tracing. Still others have noted that 
tracing cannot account for responsibility for intrinsically involuntary states like emotions 
or desires.6 Again, the thought is that no prior possession of self-control or awareness 
explains the agent’s subsequent possession of these sorts of attitudes.7 
 This represents a serious challenge to tracing. Advocates of control-based theories 
of responsibility introduced tracing to explain responsibility in cases where the agent 
seems responsible for some action or outcome despite failing to possess control at the time 
																																																								
4 This case is adapted from Sher (2009: 24). 
5 See Vargas (2005: 275). Cf. McKenna (2008). 
6 A state is intrinsically involuntary only if the agent that is the subject of that state cannot directly control 
whether the state obtains. 
7 And, insofar as possession of these sorts of attitudes is sometimes morally objectionable, tracing seems 
unable to furnish an explanation for the appropriateness of this sort of moral assessment. See Smith (2015: 
118-20). 
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of the action or outcome.8 There are, however, cases where tracing seems unhelpful 
despite the fact that the cases seem to be those that tracing was meant to explain. The 
failure of tracing in these cases gives us reason to think that introducing tracing principles 
into control-based theories of responsibility is misguided. 
 There are four possible responses to this challenge. Let’s focus on the example of 
the drunk driver mentioned at the beginning to see how these responses divide up. The 
first is to embrace skepticism about responsibility in cases that seem to require appeals to 
tracing.9 The upshot of this approach is that we must be skeptical of the claim that the 
drunk driver is responsible for his actions.10 This is unattractive in part because the driver 
seems responsible and appeals to tracing seem necessary to explain the responsibility of 
the drunk driver. That’s not a decisive consideration against the skeptic, but skepticism 
should, in general, be an option of last resort. 
 The second possible response is to claim that appeals to tracing are a mistake and 
that the failure of tracing points to an underlying problem with the control-based theory 
of responsibility that tracing was meant to supplement. Thus, the drunk driver is 
responsible, but not because he possesses or displays some level of control over his 
behavior or decisions; rather, the driver is responsible because he exhibits some morally 
																																																								
8 Theorists generally appeal to tracing in the context of blameworthiness, though the concept can also be 
utilized to explain distinctive kinds of praiseworthiness. In this paper, I confine myself to discussing tracing 
as it applies to blameworthiness, though I note this extra dimension of tracing as an important (if 
underappreciated) aspect of the concept. For some discussion of this other dimension of tracing, see Fischer 
and Ravizza (1992); McDowell (1978, 1979); van Inwagen (1989, 1994). 
9 Three recent examples of this approach are Rosen (2004), Zimmerman (2008), and Levy (2009).  
10 The skeptic can pursue one of two lines here. Either we might be skeptical that our judgments that some 
individual (like the drunk driver) is responsible are never justified or we might be skeptical that some 
individual is actually responsible. In the former case, the drunk driver might be responsible though we 
could never have a justified belief that this is the case. In the latter case, the drunk driver might not be 
responsible at all. None of this, however, directly threatens the system of legal sanctions and punishments 
mentioned at the outset. One could imagine a society where people adopt widespread epistemic or 
metaphysical skepticism about moral responsibility that does not extend to the legal responsibility of 
wrongdoers. 
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objectionable attitude that makes appropriate certain forms of moral evaluation.11 On 
this approach, we give up the need for appeals to tracing because we give up the need to 
anchor responsibility in control. While this approach has been developed and refined in a 
number of interesting and subtle ways, I will not consider it here. The merits and 
shortcomings of this approach require separate treatment.12 
 The third possible response is to agree that appeals to tracing are mistaken, but to 
retain the centrality of control in explanations of responsibility. The motivation for this is 
that appeals to tracing belie an ill-considered or flat-footed theory of action. Given an 
adequate understanding of the nature of temporally extended action and the distribution 
of intentionality through actions embedded in some larger plan, we can explain the 
responsibility of the drunk driver and the daydreaming captain without appealing to 
tracing. 
 The fourth possible response is for advocates of control-based theories of 
responsibility to face the challenges to tracing head on. This response requires, in part, 
adequate explanations of responsibility that utilize tracing in cases like the daydreaming 
captain mentioned above. The motivation for this response stems from a commitment to 
the idea that tracing is essential for control-based theories of responsibility. 
 Matt King has put forward the most recent argument for the third response. King 
argues that an adequate control-based theory of responsibility need not incorporate any 
appeals to tracing to account for responsibility in cases where an agent apparently lacks 
control.13 The advantage of King’s position is that it allows a control-based theory of 
																																																								
11 See note 2 for references. 
12 To get a taste of the shortcomings, see King (2009: 583-87) and Vargas (2013: 142-46). 
13 King (2014). 
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responsibility to retain its explanatory scope without appealing to any theoretically 
problematic tracing principles. 
 The argument for this position has a simple structure. One can explain an agent’s 
responsibility, he claims, in paradigmatic ‘tracing cases’ (like the case of the drunk driver) 
without utilizing any appeals to tracing. These tracing cases can be modeled and 
evaluated either as instances of reckless or negligent behavior.14 An agent is reckless with 
respect to some form of behavior if the agent knowingly engages in the behavior with an 
awareness of the risks associated with that behavior. An agent is negligent with respect to 
some form of behavior if the agent engages in the behavior without any suitable 
awareness of the risks associated with that behavior. For example, suppose someone 
throws a baseball-sized rock over the edge of a cliff while she is hiking. If the agent is 
aware of some risk that the rock might hit someone, then the agent is reckless in throwing 
the rock. If the agent is not aware of any such risk and there is some risk, then the agent is 
negligent in throwing the rock.15 The explanation of responsibility in either case does not 
require tracing, so an adequate control-based theory of responsibility does not require a 
tracing principle. 
 King’s argument, then, relies on three claims: 
(1) We can model tracing cases exhaustively as instances of recklessness or 
negligence. 
(2) If we model tracing cases as instances of recklessness, then tracing is 
superfluous. 
(3) If we model tracing cases as instances of negligence, then tracing is unhelpful. 
  
																																																								
14 King (2014: 465-66). 
15 This characterization is, admittedly, rough. For instance, negligence generally presupposes that the 
potential risks are such that the agent should have known about the risks or that there is some reasonable 
expectation that the agent be aware of the associated risks. 
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For King’s argument to work, it must be the case that every instance of responsibility for 
either reckless or negligent behavior can be explained without appeals to tracing.  
 In what follows, I target the third premise of this argument. I claim that the 
argument that explanations of responsibility for negligence do not require tracing wrongly 
assumes that explanations of responsibility in these cases have a uniform structure. I 
argue that there are at least two different kinds of negligence, and explanations of 
responsibility for one kind require tracing.  
 Responding to King’s argument provides a way to generalize the account of 
tracing offered here in two ways. First, the account of tracing indicates a wider range of 
cases than drunk drivers where tracing is needed to explain responsibility. Second, the 
argument shows that tracing is indispensable for a control-based theory of responsibility, 
in part because tracing is needed to explain certain instances of responsibility for 
negligence. Generalizing the account in this way provides an occasion to consider why 
our temporally extended agency leaves us susceptible to negligence and why this makes 
tracing a fundamental feature of any control-based responsibility theory.   
 
 
1. The control-based theory of responsibility 
 
Before proceeding to King’s argument, we should get clear on the theoretical 
commitments of a control-based theory of responsibility. A control-based theory of 
responsibility locates responsible agency in the possession and exercise of agential 
capacities implicated in the production of effective self-governed action and the rational 
governance of attitude formation and cultivation.16 Normally, control-based theories 
																																																								
16 Cf. Vargas (2013: 203). Here, responsible agency just is the possession of capacities constitutive of effective 
and rational self-governance. 
	 8	
countenance two kinds of capacities as constitutive of this morally significant self-
governance.17 The first are those capacities that enable agents to exhibit self-governance. 
Self-governance, broadly construed, picks out the activity of mechanisms and processes 
that contribute to engaging in goal-directed behavior. This includes, but is not limited to, 
the capacity for behavior regulation, the ability to adopt and update goals, and the 
coordination of plans over time. The second set of capacities constitutive of control are 
those that afford agents awareness of their moral environment (foresight, means-end 
reasoning, etc.). Thus, control picks out agents that exhibit suitable degrees of self-
governance and awareness. 
 Control-based explanations of responsibility pick out some suitable relation (at the 
moment of wrongdoing) between an agent’s responsibility-relevant capacities that are 
constitutive of control and some bad action or outcome as a necessary condition for 
ascribing responsibility for that action or outcome.18 These explanations are attractive 
because they pick out a relation that ties the agent to her wrongdoing in a way that makes 
it appropriate to blame the agent for her wrong conduct.19 
 What makes drunk driving cases paradigmatic instances of tracing cases is that in 
cases of drunk driving there appears to be no immediate relation between the agent’s 
responsibility-relevant capacities and the wrong conduct. While drunk, the agent is locally 
incapacitated in a way that disrupts connecting the agent (via her capacities) to her bad 
conduct, where local incapacitation consists in some (but not all) agential capacities being 
masked or thwarted temporarily. This highlights the need for tracing: without it, we 																																																								
17 Vargas (2013: 200). Some of my terminology diverges from that of Vargas. 
18 In what follows, I will focus exclusively on behavior that seems to merit distinctively negative moral 
reactions. This is because King focuses on these kinds of cases and others in the literature do the same. As I 
noted before, however, there are interesting questions about the way in which advocates of control-based 
theories can utilize tracing to explain distinctive forms of praiseworthy behavior. 
19 See Sher (2009: 73-75). 
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would have no way to connect agents of this sort to their bad conduct and thus no 
obvious means of explaining why such agents are responsible for their bad conduct. 
 The goal of the non-tracing control-based theory of responsibility that King 
defends is to offer some account of responsibility in these paradigmatic tracing cases 
without utilizing appeals to tracing. This retains the basic contours of a control-based 
theory of responsibility while jettisoning any theoretically costly or implausible machinery 
like tracing. In the next section, I consider King’s discussion of negligence and offer some 
criticism. 
 
2. Modeling Negligence: Regress and Utility 
 
 Negligence can be defined in terms of the unwitting risk of wrongdoing. An agent 
is negligent when the agent behaves in a way that greatly increases the risk of failure or 
wrongdoing without ever realizing that she is at risk of failure or wrongdoing until it is too 
late. What distinguishes cases of recklessness from negligence is that in the latter case the 
agent unwittingly risks wrongdoing and is never aware of this risk until it is too late. Acting 
negligently (or being negligent with respect to some action) consists in acting in such a 
way that risks failing to act successfully (e.g., driving negligently consists in diriving in such 
a way that one unwittingly increases the risk of crashing). 
  King suggests that negligent agents are sometimes responsible for their negligent 
wrongdoing, though the explanation of responsibility for negligence cannot invoke 
tracing.20 This is because tracing explanations of responsibility for negligence either 
devolve into an infinite regress or add unnecessary theoretical machinery. I explain each 
of these points in turn before offering some criticism. 																																																								
20 King (2014: 474). 
	 10	
 Tracing explanations of negligent wrongdoing devolve into infinite regress in the 
following way. Suppose that Pete crashes while driving drunk. Further, suppose that Pete 
is so drunk that he lacks control at the time just before the crash. Pete is responsible for 
crashing while drunk (he was not, let’s suppose, coerced or manipulated into drinking too 
much). When we try to apply a trace to Pete, however, we run into a problem. Pete has 
been negligent, so, by definition, there is no prior moment where Pete possesses suitable 
awareness of the harms likely to result from his risky behavior. And, because he lacks 
awareness, Pete also lacks control at all relevant prior moments. So, when we try to draw 
the trace to explain Pete’s responsibility for negligence, we find no suitable terminus for 
the trace.  
 The only prior moments available that might anchor a trace are those where Pete 
should have, but failed to, exhibit more control. In these moments, however, Pete is also 
negligent. For example, we might try to trace responsibility for crashing back to some 
earlier choice point during the night. Pete, however, also lacks awareness in these earlier 
moments, so Pete’s decision to drink heavily (or continue drinking) is also negligent. Thus, 
we have to apply a trace to Pete’s negligent decision to drink to explain his responsibility 
for that negligent decision.21 The regress, at this point, becomes clear. 
 Suppose that we could formulate an explanation of the responsibility for the 
negligent decision that both explains the responsibility for the later crash and does not 
lapse into an infinite regress.22 We might be tempted to think that tracing is helpful in this 
																																																								
21 King (2014: 474). 
22 King thinks it is not possible to explain responsibility for negligence in terms of control (see King, 2009). 
The point of the futility argument against tracing is that, per impossible, were someone to formulate a tracing 
explanation of responsibility for negligence, there would no longer be any need to invoke tracing. 
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scenario because we could explain Pete’s responsibility for crashing in terms of his 
negligent decision-making earlier at the bar.  
 But this will not work. Consider the negligent behavior (N1). Either we can or 
cannot explain responsibility for N1 in terms of control. The tracing theorist assumes we 
cannot (which, recall, is part of the motivation for introducing tracing principles in the 
first place). So, we must find an earlier negligent moment (N2) to anchor responsibility for 
N1. Either we can explain responsibility for N2 in terms of control or we cannot. If we can, 
then King claims we can apply the explanation of responsibility for N2 to N1 without ever 
needing to invoke tracing. If we cannot, then we need to find an earlier negligent moment 
(N3), and at this point the regress again becomes clear. Thus, even if one could solve the 
regress problem, tracing still has no role to play because tracing becomes unhelpful.23 
 The problem with King’s suggestion to transfer the explanatory schema for 
negligent decision-making to negligent behavior is that there might be qualitatively 
distinct kinds of negligent failures. Some negligence occurs in virtue of having no 
awareness of the moral qualities of one’s behavior or the likely consequences thereof. 
Other instances of negligence occur in virtue of having substandard awareness of one’s 
behavior and the moral environment. The difference between lack of awareness and 
substandard awareness turns on the possession of some epistemic capacity (or capacities) 
that enable an agent to appreciate certain considerations and act in light of those 
considerations. When an agent possesses the appropriate epistemic capacities but fails to 
exercise them appropriately in a case of negligent wrongdoing, the agent possesses 
substandard awareness. When an agent does not possess these capacities in a case of 
negligent wrongdoing (either because something thwarts the proper functioning of these 																																																								
23 King (2014: 475). 
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capacities or the agent simply does not possess the requisite capacities), then the agent 
possesses no awareness.  
 Take the example of Pete. When he is sitting in the bar deliberating about 
whether to drink (or continue to drink), he possesses the requisite epistemic capacities to 
appreciate reasons to stop drinking (or, at least, to drink more moderately) but fails to 
appropriately exercise these capacities. Here, Pete possesses substandard awareness.24 
Contrast this substandard awareness with the total lack of awareness that Pete possesses 
moments before the crash. At the time of the crash, Pete might possess no awareness of 
what he is doing or why he is doing it. 
 The upshot, then, is that we can explain responsibility for negligent action (an 
instance where an agent should have been aware of some risk of harm, but could not 
have been aware) by appealing to some negligent decision (where the agent both should 
have and could have been aware of the risk of harm). This blocks the regress concern that 
King raises because we can, presumably, explain responsibility for some negligent 
decisions directly without appealing to prior choice points (cf. Clarke, 2014: 167 and 
Murray, 2017 for two proposals on direct responsibility for negligence). However, this 
also makes clear why we cannot simply apply the explanatory schema for the negligent 
decision directly to the negligent behavior. A crucial part of explaining responsibility for 
the negligent decision is the presence of certain unexercised epistemic capacities that the 
agent could have exercised, and these capacities ground the explanation of responsibility. 																																																								
24 There are a number of ways to analyze what substandard awareness consists in. For example, it could be 
that Pete has, in some sense, all of the information necessary to correctly infer that he should stop drinking 
and he fails to perform the crucial inference. Or it could be that he is simply unaware of some fact that he 
needs to draw the appropriate conclusion about what ought to be done in the circumstances. Or Pete might 
only be aware of potential risks of his current conduct at a level of granularity that is too coarse-grained. In 
any case, the crucial point here is that when Pete possesses substandard awareness, he has the ability to 
correctly evaluate the circumstances but fails to exercise this ability. 
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In the cases of negligent behavior at issue here, the agent is locally incapacitated, so there 
is no explanation of responsibility in terms of available, unexercised capacities.   
 At this point, one might wonder why we should bother with substandard 
awareness at all. Someone might object that agents either have awareness or they don’t. 
In the former case, there is recklessness; in the latter case, negligence. There is no middle 
category of partial or substandard awareness. And even if there were, it doesn’t seem like 
the substandard aspects of the awareness are doing any explanatory work. 
 Substandard awareness, however, is useful because it picks out two distinct 
phenomena, both of which relate to negligence in interesting ways. Pete is aware of 
something (the color of his beer or the music in the bar, perhaps), but he is not aware of 
any risk of harm. What makes Pete’s awareness substandard is that he possesses an ability 
to become aware that he fails to exercise. However, we can imagine alternative cases of 
negligence where the negligent agent’s awareness is constituted by attitudes with 
extremely coarse-grained content. These alternative cases suggest the additional utility of 
substandard awareness. 
 Suppose that Pete does have some thought while sitting at the bar that something 
bad might occur, but the thought does not have content that is any more specific. In this 
case, it does not seem like Pete has the right kind of awareness to constitute recklessness 
(or, he does not have the kind of awareness to make appropriate the description of 
subsequent behavior as reckless). There is a certain granularity of awareness at which one 
fails to foresee the occurrence of a certain event. In fact, I would venture a guess that 
most people fail to pick out many of the foreseeable upshots of their plans with fine-
grained descriptions. Pete is one such individual, and the description of his awareness as 
‘substandard’ seems apt. Thus, we can apply the substandard awareness label to instances 
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where agents have coarse-grained attitudes that fail to connect these agents to the 
foreseeable upshots of their behavior in recklessness-constituting ways.25 
  
3. Awareness and allocation 
Thus far, the account of negligence developed here has depended on notions like 
substandard awareness, incapacitation, and epistemic capacities. These can be filled out 
in empirically tractable ways, and doing so lends some plausibility to the idea that some 
instances of negligence result from substandard awareness. This, in turn, explains why 
substandard awareness sometimes generates local incapacitation, thereby setting up the 
need for tracing-based explanations of responsibility. 
 Recent work on the psychology and neuroscience of decision-making suggests that 
people implement cognitive strategies when performing tasks over time. These strategies 
consist in differential allocations of psychological resources over time (Braver, 2012). 
Some strategies are more proactive, where these involve sustaining goal representations in 
working memory continuously to bias attention, perception, and action systems toward 
goal-relevant processing (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Other strategies are more reactive, 
where these involve transient, bottom-up reactivation of goal representations at the 
																																																								
25 Someone might think that Pete, even when he possesses this coarse-grained awareness, is still reckless. 
Awareness is awareness, and if it’s present, then the agent is reckless. This objection, however, leads to a 
problem. If we think that substandard awareness (as I’ve characterized it above) is not negligence-
constituting, then we might eliminate negligence as an interesting category of action. Every minimally 
conscientious person has, at some point, had the thought that something bad will likely come about through 
future exercises of one’s own agency. If we think of awareness, no matter how coarse-grained, as 
recklessness-constituting, does this awareness distribute pervasively, such that almost all future acts of 
wrongdoing are reckless? If not, in what way do we block the distribution of this substandard awareness in a 
principled way? This problem suggests that we take substandard awareness as negligence-constituting (of 
course, there is a further issue of what the standards of content granularity are, but that’s a familiar debate 
from action theory and substantive disputes about the nature of foresight). 
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moment of action, relying on spontaneous recall or bottom-up associative cues to trigger 
goal implementation (Jacoby et al., 1999). 
 Strategy selection is a form of managing psychological resources. Given limited 
psychological resources, people need to flexibly deploy different resources to different 
tasks at different times. Since people cannot pay attention to everything all the time, they 
must choose where, when, and how intensely to deploy attention. This gives us an 
empirical way to explain the epistemic capacities implicated in responsible agency and 
the foregoing account of negligence. The relevant epistemic capacities are whatever is 
realized by the systems that compute and implement cognitive strategies for resource 
allocation. 
 Similarly, we can understand awareness and substandard awareness in terms of 
allocation. People can focus either proactively or reactively on whatever they’re doing. 
The allocation of underlying attentional and mnemonic resources constitutes an agent’s 
awareness. Substandard awareness results from allocating insufficient resources to a task 
or implementing a faulty strategy. For example, someone who lets their mind wander 
while driving busy city streets exhibits substandard awareness, because the city 
environment is not conducive to reactive task engagement. Hence, the allocation of 
psychological resources is substandard in virtue of greatly raising the probability that 
something bad will happen (e.g., an accident). 
 Strategy selection systems, and the inputs to which these are sensitive, may seem 
to be subconscious and subpersonal. However, some of the considerations that determine 
strategy selection rise to the level of consciousness. In this way, strategy selection manifests 
a unique form of reasons-responsiveness. Broadly speaking, strategy selection is responsive 
to perceived task factors and individual differences variables (Braver, 2012: 108-10). 
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Recent computational work has identified components of the cost/benefit analyses that 
determine strategy and which variables differentially influence these analyses. Overall, the 
core variables are the importance of the task (Savine & Braver, 2010), the probability of 
successfully performing a task relative to a particular allocation (Kool, Gershman, & 
Cushman, 2017), the anticipated workload of the task (Speer et al., 2003), the anticipated 
level of distraction in the task environment (Burgess & Braver, 2010), and the opportunity 
costs associated with focusing on one task rather than others (Inzlicht, Shenhav, & 
Olivola, 2018; Kurzban et al., 2013).  These can be grouped into three overarching 
factors: (1) the level of expected effort needed to perform the task well; (2) the value of 
performing the task, and; (3) the opportunity cost of focusing on task performance 
(Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Botvinick & Cohen, 2014). 
 These factors provide a schema for identifying different kinds of negligence. Some 
negligence derives from motivational deficits. For example, someone might neglect to 
prepare for their upcoming lectures because they don’t care much about teaching. This 
lack of motivation results in insufficiently allocating resources to teaching preparation. 
But not all negligence derives from motivational deficits. Consider the ship captain 
mentioned in the Introduction. She, presumably, cares about the ship and the safety of 
the passengers (or at least herself!). In this case, negligence might derive from being overly 
confident in being able to successfully navigate without thinking hard about piloting (this, 
in turn, might result from travelling a familiar route).26 Finally, some negligence might 
derive from underestimating the effect of a current allocation policy on the ability to 
make future allocations. For example, suppose someone stays up late playing video games 
																																																								
26 Of course, it’s entirely possible that the negligence derives from motivational deficits. The point here is 
that not all negligence reflects lack of motivation. 
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despite having a job interview in the morning. This could result from underestimating the 
effect of staying up late on performance in the interview. In each of these cases, poor 
allocation policies result from different causes that reflect the computational elements of 
strategic decision-making. 
 Sometimes, a particular allocation of psychological resources can result in 
downstream local incapacitation. Pete’s drunk driving is an example of this (as is the 
aforementioned negligent teaching prep, the negligent piloting, and negligently under-
sleeping). Though the terminology is ham-fisted, the idea is that Pete pursues drinking at 
one point in a way that makes him incapable of properly allocating his psychological 
resources in a manner conducive to pursuing his goals here and now (i.e., driving home 
safely). However, these bits of local incapacitation should not always excuse wrongdoing, 
and we need some way to tie the agent to their wrongdoing even when locally 
incapacitated. Tracing enables the transfer of responsibility in these cases. 
 Thinking of negligence in terms of psychological resource allocation also expands 
the range of cases where tracing is useful. Consider, for example, a case of 
procrastination. Suppose that someone needs to submit a manuscript, finish a course 
syllabus, write some letters of recommendation, and submit approval to bring a proposal 
in front of the faculty senate. There are ways to pursue these different goals over time that 
puts one in a position where it’s practically impossible to complete all these different 
goals. Procrastinating is a way of allocating one’s resources such that one becomes 
(locally) incapable of allocating one’s resources in a way that enables successful pursuit of 
one’s goals. Responsibility for, say, failing to write your recommendation letters or finish 
your manuscript is explained in terms of implementing a strategy that insufficiently 
allocated psychological resources. 
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 This provides a better picture of when tracing is useful for explaining 
responsibility for negligence. When people commit to performing a variety of tasks, they 
typically commit (implicitly) to completing those tasks within a certain timeframe. They 
also (typically implicitly) agree to be governed by certain norms and standards of 
information management, keeping track of what has been done and what must still be 
done with respect to each task (see Murray & Vargas, Forthcoming for discussion of these 
norms of information management). People can be negligent with respect to their tasks 
when they insufficiently allocate psychological resources to those tasks or implement 
strategies that are unlikely (and known to be unlikely) to successfully balance plural goal 
pursuit. On the occasions when this leads to local incapacitation (and subsequent 
negligent wrongdoing), the negligent wrongdoing remains culpable in virtue of being 
explained in terms of the earlier allocation or faulty strategy. 
 Notice that Pete’s case fits this scheme. There’s a negligent decision to drink, 
where the negligence likely derives from improperly attending to the risks of drinking. 
This results in local incapacitation and Pete’s drunk driving. The responsibility for the 
drunk driving is rooted in the responsibility for the earlier negligent decision to drink. So, 
supposing that we formulate some non-regressive explanation of Pete’s responsibility for 
his negligent decision to drink, the appeal to tracing will be helpful (and probably 
essential) to explaining Pete’s responsibility for drunk driving. Tracing can do real 
theoretical work without slipping into a regress. 
 
 
4. Ineliminable Tracing 
 
The argument to this point shows that there are cases of negligence where an agent’s 
negligent behavior results from local incapacitation. Responsibility for this negligent 
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behavior is rooted in prior substandard awareness (insufficient psychological resource 
allocation) or faulty strategy selection that leaves open the (relatively high) probability of 
goal neglect. Tracing allows us to keep negligent wrongdoers on the hook, so to speak, 
despite their local incapacitation. 
 This shows that the third premise in King’s argument is wrong. Not every 
instance of culpable negligence can be explained without tracing. The previous two 
sections show that tracing explanations of responsibility can be formulated in a useful, 
non-regressive way. In this final section, I generalize the above argument to show that 
tracing is an indispensable part of any control-based theory of responsibility. This is 
because the need for tracing derives from our nature as temporally extended, 
computationally bounded agents. 
 Human beings adopt a wide range of commitments, projects, and goals that they 
aim to complete over varying time scales. Part of the reason for this is evolutionary: our 
earliest ancestors needed to find food, build shelter, and avoid predators. Increased social 
organization modulates this plural goal pursuit. Today, apt social functioning requires 
occupying various roles, and each role is associated with different expectations and goals. 
Occupying more than one goal requires plural goal pursuit. 
 Human beings are also inherently limited creatures. Some of this derives from 
anatomy. People cannot walk in two different directions simultaneously. But some of this 
derives from our cognitive architecture. People, for instance, cannot perform two two-
digit math problems simultaneously. Many of our psychological capacities—such as 
attention, working memory, and cognitive control—are severely limited (Anderson & 
Milson, 1989; Bundesen, 1990; Cohen, 2017). These limits establish obstacles to 
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successful plural goal pursuit. Roughly, people are trying to do a lot of things with 
precious few resources. 
 To reconcile plural goal pursuit with limited psychological capacity, human 
beings scatter their agency over time. Scattered agency consists in the ability to variably 
apportion an action plan over time that enables efficient plural goal pursuit while 
compensating for limited psychological resources. In other words, scattered agents can 
start a project, put it aside for awhile while doing something else, all while remembering 
to come back and finish at an opportune time.27  
 The possibility of negligence arises from scattered agency. Because we scatter our 
actions through time, it is possible to never finish something that one started. It is possible 
to plan to get around to something only to never actually get to it. It is possible to make a 
commitment and never follow through. Scattered agency makes negligence possible 
because only scattered agents switch between tasks that they have not yet completed or 
shift focus away from their goals and commitments to focus on other things. 
 Consider the drunk driver mentioned in the Introduction. Earlier in the night, he 
probably made a plan to get some drinks and then drive home. But when out at the bar, 
there’s no need to focus on driving home later; instead, one focuses on conversing with 
friends. Without the goal of driving home firmly in mind, it’s easy to order a few more 
drinks than you originally planned. Perhaps the thought of driving home just doesn’t 
cross the mind. More likely, with the additional drinks comes overconfidence at one’s 
																																																								
27 The notion of scattered agency derives from the notion of a temporally scattered event (see Sorensen, 
1985). This is distinct from a spatially scattered event (e.g., the broadcasting of Welles’ War of the Worlds 
performance), where the parts of the event occur simultaneously over a large region (Lewis, 1983). An 
action counts as a temporally scattered event when the time of the action has parts that exist at different 
times and these times do not necessarily overlap with the time of the action. Scattered agents, then, are 
capable of acting in ways that consist in temporally scattered events. 
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ability to drive while intoxicated. Thus starts the cycle of negligence, which begins with 
shifting focus away from driving home. 
 Perhaps there’s a simple solution to negligence, namely always to stay focused on 
all of your goals. But that’s not possible with the limited psychological resources that 
humans possess. Perhaps people should form more modest goals. But a moment’s 
reflection shows that many of the meaningful and rewarding activities of life are fluid in a 
way that opens up the possibility of negligence. There are few activities that people 
perform all in one go, and limiting oneself only to such activities makes for a relatively 
mundane existence. 
 To summarize, then, scattered agency opens up the possibility of negligence. But 
scattered agency itself appears to be the only efficient solution to navigating the tension 
between the kinds of lives we want to lead (plural goal pursuit) and the kinds of creatures 
we are (psychologically limited). Negligence is a quirky upshot of the scattered agency we 
exhibit. 
 As we saw, some kinds of negligence can, in the right circumstances, generate 
local incapacitation. Poorly allocating one’s psychological resources in acting over time 
can generate local inabilities to properly allocate psychological resources to various 
commitments. Procrastination is a vivid example of a poor allocation strategy that can 
lead to local incapacitation. This local incapacitation should not, however, function as a 
general excuse for wrongdoing. Thus, some negligent wrongdoing is culpable even when 
such wrongdoing results from incapacitation.  
 When we scatter our agency, our actions consist in temporally scattered events. 
There is temporal discontinuity between performances of the same activity (e.g., writing a 
manuscript over many years). In the abstract, one can set out to A, switch over to doing 
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B, and leave A-ing unfinished. In order to be responsible for one’s negligence with respect 
to A-ing, there needs to be some way to transfer responsibility through these temporal 
gaps. For a scattered agent, the stream of agency is continuously disrupted and diverted 
in pursuing various goals over time. Tracing enables distributing responsibility through 
these temporal gaps to preserve responsibility.  
 At the outset, I noted that control-based theories of responsibility locate 
responsible agency in the possession of capacities constitutive of self-governance and 
awareness. We now see that these capacities are also those that constitute scattered 
agency. The kinds of capacities central to responsibility are just those capacities that we 
manifest in ordinary exercises of agency. This indicates that tracing is a fundamental 
feature of control-based theories of responsibility (or, those theories of responsibility that 
describe creatures like us). The possibility of negligence follows from scattered agency, the 
kind of agency that compensates for pursuing a plurality of goals under conditions of 
bounded rationality. Explaining responsibility for such negligence sometimes requires 
tracing. So, a theory of responsibility that hinges responsibility on particular 
manifestations of agential capacities requires tracing to explain responsibility for 
negligence. 
 Offering a control-based theory of responsibility that does not include a tracing 
principle seems implausible, and reflecting on the reasons why reveals something 
interesting about the role that tracing plays in control-based theories of responsibility. 
Tracing is necessary to explain why scattered agents are responsible for negligence even 
when the parts of one’s negligence are temporally discontinuous. Tracing, then, provides 
a plausible way to distribute responsibility over the career of a scattered agent.  
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